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Respite for Tantalus: Illinois’s Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act – Due
Process in (In)Action
BRIAN E. WILSON*
Under current Illinois law, criminals who have been adjudicated guilty
of committing certain types of sex offenses can, at any point during their incarceration, be involuntarily committed indefinitely. They are sent to the
Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville, Illinois, where they are to undergo treatment for various disorders, and are not released until the Department of Human Services determines they no longer present a danger of reoffending. While this is the intent of the law, in practice this secondary commitment is violating these offenders’ Due Process rights.
This Comment examines the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
in Illinois; it’s background, what the Act allows, and how it is operating in
practice. It compares Illinois’s Act with those of other states, shows why the
Act in Illinois is violating the resident’s Due Process rights, and offers some
solutions for the State to apply to make the Act conform to the law so the
State is no longer violating the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.
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I cannot say whether things will get better if we change;
what I can say is they must change if they are to get better.1
- Georg C. Lichtenberg

I.

INTRODUCTION

In ancient Greek mythology, Tantalus was punished by the gods for cutting up his son Pelops, putting him in a stew, and serving it to the gods at a
banquet.2 In retribution, the gods sent him to Tartarus, the deepest place in
the underworld, where he suffered from eternal thirst and hunger.3 In Tartarus, he stood in a pool of water, but every time he bent down to slake his
thirst, the water would recede.4 Every time he reached for fruit from the tree
overhead, wind would blow the branches away.5 His name and punishment
*
The author would like to express his sincere and heartfelt gratitude to the following people: Matt Kratky, always a friend; Thomas O. McCulloch and all the attorneys and
staff at the DeKalb County, Illinois Public Defender’s office; Professors Marc Falkoff and
Robert Jones, for helping me see the way to go; Professors David Taylor and Jack O’Malley,
for taking the time to provide me with help when I needed it; Professors Meredith Stange and
Jay Streitz, for constant support; to all the faculty and staff at NIU’s College of Law; to all the
students and colleagues of NIU Law Review; and, last but never least, my family for enduring
alongside me throughout.
1. WISDOM QUOTES, http://www.wisdomquotes.com/quote/georg-c-lichtenberg2.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
2. A. H. PETISCUS, THE GODS OF OLYMPOS, OR MYTHOLOGY OF THE GREEKS AND
ROMANS 163 (Katherine A. Raleigh trans., Paternoster Square, T. Fisher Unwin 20th ed.)
(1892).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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have become synonymous with enticement without gratification (to be “tantalized”).6
Much like this tragic mythological figure, those involuntarily committed under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (hereinafter
the “SVP Act” or the “Act”) always have the hope of being released from the
Treatment and Detention Facility (hereinafter “TDF”) located in Rushville,
Illinois, but the reality of getting conditional or complete release is something
far more elusive than what is constitutionally allowed to satisfy the Due Process Clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 As a result, how
Illinois is applying its Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is violating
the constitutional rights of those committed under it.
In Part II, I will provide a brief background of the origins of commitment acts passed by legislatures in response to sexually violent offenders.
Next, I will introduce Illinois’s Act, examine the legislative reasoning for its
passing, what the Act says, and the nature of the commitment and conditional
or full release under the Act. In Part IV, I will examine the language of the
SVP Acts of New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin and how well they are
working in terms of release and recidivism from commitment. Following
this, I will examine the SVP Acts of Minnesota and Missouri, and why both
of these have recently been held by federal courts as violating Due Process.
In Part VI, I will show why Illinois’s SVP Act, as it has been and is being
applied, also violates the Due Process rights of those committed under the
Act. Next, I will address the continued need for an SVP Act in Illinois, and
in Part VIII, I will offer some suggestions as to how the State can resolve the
issues raised so that it is more in conformity with the Due Process rights of
those committed, including mandatory conditional release after a certain age,
a reemphasis on conditional release given the conditions, a reevaluation of
the process of granting conditional release, offering more cost-effective solutions, and how to fix the bias of evaluations for release. I conclude this
Comment, in Part IX, by reemphasizing the need for the State to address these
concerns.

6.

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
(Philip Babcock Grove, editor in chief and the Merriam-Webster editorial staff,
Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield Massachusetts 1993). “[T]o tease or torment by presenting
something to the view and exciting desire but continually frustrating the expectations by keeping it out of reach.”
7. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/ 1-99 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
UNABRIDGED
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO SVP LAWS AND DUE PROCESS
A.

WASHINGTON STATE

Washington was the first state to pass a sexually violent persons (hereinafter “SVP”) law in 1990.8 In response to public outcry from two brutally
violent attacks, one by Earl K. Shriner,9 and the other by Gene Raymond
Kane10, the then Governor of Washington – Booth Gardner – instituted a task
force to determine what changes should be made to the current commitment
laws in order to prevent these types of tragedies from occurring.11 The task
force’s most radical and controversial recommendation was for a new commitment law that would authorize expanded authority and grant the state the
needed power to commit people like Shriner and Kane past the maximum
prison sentence.12 Prosecutors would have the ability to initiate civil commitment proceedings “for a person whose sentence for a sexually violent offense
has expired or is about to expire.”13 Based on these ideas set forth by the task
force, the Washington legislature unanimously passed the first SVP Act.14
Many states quickly followed, including Arizona, Kansas, Wisconsin, and
Illinois.15

8. Roxanne Lieb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: Legislative History
and Comparisons With Other States, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY (Dec. 1996),
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1244/Wsipp_Washingtons-Sexually-Violent-PredatorLaw-Legislative-History-and-Comparisons-With-Other-States_Full-Report.pdf.
9. In 1987, the State was unable to commit Shriner under the current laws, despite
his having a long history of kidnapping and sexual assaults and being mentally challenged. Id.
at 1. Two years after his release, he raped, strangled, and sexually mutilated a seven-year-old
boy. Id.
10. Gene Kane, who the State also failed to commit, had been convicted of attacking
two women; while on work release, he kidnapped and murdered another woman. Id.
11. Id.
12. Roxanne Lieb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: Legislative History
and Comparisons With Other States, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY 1-2 (Dec. 1996),
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1244/Wsipp_Washingtons-Sexually-Violent-PredatorLaw-Legislative-History-and-Comparisons-With-Other-States_Full-Report.pdf.
13. Id. at v.
14. Id. at 1.
15. A Profile of Civil Commitment Around the Country, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2007/03/03/us/20070304_CIVIL_GRAPHIC.html (Arizona passed their SVP Act in 1995; Kansas in 1994; Wisconsin in 1994; Illinois in 1997).
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KANSAS V. HENDRICKS

The first and biggest legal challenge to SVP Acts was the case of Kansas
v. Hendricks.16 Leroy Hendricks had a long history of child molestation, including against his stepchildren.17 Hendricks became the first person in Kansas to be committed under their Act, and the case went to the United States
Supreme Court after the Supreme Court of Kansas overturned his commitment based on a substantive Due Process issue requiring a finding of a mental
illness.18
This landmark case challenged Kansas’s SVP Act and the Court held
that the Act did not violate Double Jeopardy or Due Process.19 In a five-four
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Kansas’s SVP Act was constitutional.20 The Supreme Court found that Double Jeopardy was a non-issue,
since the Act was civil in nature (and thus was not additional punishment).
The Court also found that the Act did not violate Due Process because the
Act linked past sexually violent crimes with the danger of committing future
crimes due to pre-existing mental abnormality, which is consistent with previous types of commitment laws.21 In its decision, the Court gave some very
clear warnings on when involuntary commitment under such an Act would
be considered in violation of the Constitution – such as when the institutionalization becomes punitive.22 Further, the Court noted that the State “has an
obligation to provide treatment” to committed persons.23
The Court stated that “freedom from physical restraint ‘has always been
at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
16.
17.

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
Wray Herbert, Predicting Sexual Crime: Are the Experts Biased?, ASS’N FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/news/were-only-human/predicting-sexual-crime-are-the-experts-biased.html.
18. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
19. Id. Hendricks also made an ex post facto argument, which will not be considered
here as being beyond the scope of this Note, except to state that this argument also failed.
20. Id. at 373.
21. Id. at 356-60, 361-69. Hendricks’s specific argument was that the Act called for
a finding of “mental abnormality,” which was statutorily different from other commitment
laws that called for a finding of a “mental illness.” Id. at 359. An additional argument was that
the term “mental abnormality” was not an accepted term in the scientific community. Id. at
358-59. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument, noting that it is up the individual
States on what language they are to use and how they are to define those terms. Id.
22. Id. at 363. The Court noted that the conditions are “essentially the same . . . as
any involuntarily committed patient in the state mental institution” and that the person committed is not “subject to the more restrictive conditions placed on state prisoners” Id. (emphasis added). If commitment became punitive as opposed to therapeutic in nature, it would violate Double Jeopardy.
23. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 367 (1997). (“Thus . . . the State has a statutory obligation to provide ‘care and treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect recovery.’”) (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)).
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governmental action . . . .’”24 But the Court went on to state that while liberty
under the Due Process Clause is not absolute, it is required that there be a
“proof of dangerousness . . . [and] proof of some additional factor, such as a
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality’” to take it away.25 The Supreme
Court ruled that Kansas’s Act satisfied these requirements, but if the state
involuntarily commits someone, it has to be due to a mental “disorder” as
well as a showing of dangerousness—without both, the state violates the Due
Process Clause.26
An additional warning was given by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in his
concurring opinion, stating that:
If the object or purpose of the Kansas law had been
to provide treatment but the treatment provisions
were adopted as a sham or mere pretext, there would
have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to
punish . . . [i]f, however, civil commitment were to
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence . . . our precedents would not suffice to validate it.27
Justice Kennedy clarified that a state seeking commitment for an SVP
must thread a very small needle: it must show that the person to be committed
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, that he has a mental disorder, that he is also dangerous, and that the commitment is not meant to continue punishment for a crime. If any part of this breaks down, the State has
violated the person’s Due Process rights.28

24. Id. at 356 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)).
25. Id. at 358.
26. The standard was clarified in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). In this case,
Justice Stephen G. Breyer stated that the showing of dangerousness must not be absolute, but
rather “proof of serious difficulty in controlling [the sexually violent] behavior” in order to
satisfy substantive Due Process. Id. at 413. This leads to the obvious conclusion that if the
person’s ability to control the behavior is less than “seriously difficult,” then they cannot be
committed.
27. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-73.
28. Leroy Hendricks was eventually released in 2005, eleven years after his commitment began. See Eric Weslander, Notorious Molester Now in Rural Lawrence, LAWRENCE
JOURNAL WORLD (June 3, 2005), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/jun/03/molester/?sexual_predator_law. At the time of his release, he was over seventy years old, was confined to a
wheelchair due to complications with diabetes, and had suffered a stroke. Id. Despite this, he
was still subject to twenty-four-hour monitoring. Id.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO ILLINOIS’S SVP ACT

The disappearance of a sense of responsibility is the most
far-reaching consequence of submission to authority.29
- Stanley Milgram
A.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ILLINOIS’S SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PERSONS COMMITMENT ACT

In 1997, the Illinois Senate considered adopting an SVP Act.30 The
sponsor of Senate Bill 6, Senator Christine Radogno, told her fellow senators
that “[c]urrently civil commitment can be used as an alternative to criminal
sentencing. This legislation . . . will allow for both criminal sentencing and
then civil commitment.”31 She noted that the Bill was “[an attempt] to address
the fact that many sexually violent persons are extremely difficult to rehabilitate” and tend to be repeat offenders.32 Senator Radogno concluded her state29. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 8 (Harper & Row 1974).
30. S.B. 6, 90th Ill. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess., Transcript of Senate Debate 30 (Mar.
18,
1997)
(statement
of
Sen.
Radongo),
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans90/ST031897.pdf.
31. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
32. Id. The idea that “many sexually violent persons . . . tend to be repeat offenders”
is not supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Matthew R. Durose, Patrick A. Langan & Erica L.
Schmitt, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1 (Nov. 2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf (5.3% of offenders recidivated in the first three years of release); Joseph R. Tatar II & Anthony Streveler, Sex
Offender Recidivism after Release from Prison, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF CORRS. 5 (Sept.
2015),
http://doc.wi.gov/Documents/WEB/ABOUT/DATARESEARCH/NOTABLESTATISTICS/Sexual%20Offender%2
0Recidivism%20Report%209.22.2015%20FINAL.pdf (showing the three-year recidivism
rate at 1.5%, five-year rate at 1.7%, ten-year rate at 4.4%, and fifteen-year rate at 6.0%). A
2013 review of the recidivism risk of Florida SVPs determined the rate was 3.6%.Van Orden
v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, n. 3 (E.D. Mo. 2015); R Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière,
Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. OF
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 348 (Apr. 1998) (in 61 studies that looked at the recidivism rates of 28,972 sexual offenders, it was found that the risk was 13.4% overall); R.
Karl Hanson & Kelly Morton-Bourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism: An Updated MetaAnalysis, PUB. SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAN. 15 (2004), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2004-02-prdctrs-sxl-rcdvsm-pdtd/2004-02-prdctrs-sxlrcdvsm-pdtd-eng.pdf (looking at 95 studies and over 31,000 sex offenders, the rate was 13.7%
for all types of offenders); Stan Orchowsky & Janice Iwama, Improving State Criminal History Records: Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released in 2001, JUSTICE RESEARCH & STATISTICS
ASS’N 17 (Nov. 2009), http://www.jrsa.org/projects/sex-offender-final-report.pdf (the recidivism risk for new sex offenses were 3.4% in Alaska, 2.3% in Arizona, 3.8% in Delaware,
3.9% in Iowa, 1.8% in New Mexico, 4.0% in South Carolina, 9.0% in Tennessee, and 2.4% in
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ments by asking the Senate to pass the Bill so that “[they] can continue working on this concept.”33 The Bill then went to the House of Representatives,
where Representative Tom Dart urged passing the Bill in order to “ensure
our streets are more safe” from “people . . . we know are predators, who are
going to prey on our children and on adults.”34 In concluding his remarks,
Representative Dart stated that “[t]his is something that is being tried in other
states. It’s innovative and it is something that truly gets at the heart of the
problem.”35 The House unanimously passed the Bill and the two proposed
amendments.36
The day the Bill unanimously passed in the Illinois Senate, the president
of the Senate immediately afterwards acknowledged some sixth graders in
the gallery, who were visiting on a field trip—just another mundane, ho-hum
day in the State Legislature, as it decides to involuntarily commit people
based on an “innovative concept.”37 In 1998, Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act became effective.38
B.

WHAT THE ACT DOES

The Act allows for prosecutors to petition the court to involuntarily
commit a person who has committed a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental disorder that makes it “substantially probable” that they
will “engage in acts of sexual violence.”39 This allows the State to involuntarily commit someone on the basis that they will commit a future crime after

Illinois). It should be noted that recidivism risk can vary on age of release and if any treatment
program has been completed by the offender, and that for purposes of this Note, the percentages for sex re-offenses were used, not recidivism rates of committing general crimes.
33. S.B. 6, 90th Ill. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess., Transcript of Senate Debate 30 (Mar.
18,
1997)
(statement
of
Sen.
Radongo),
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans90/ST031897.pdf.
34. S.B. 6, 90th Ill. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess., Transcript of House Debate 167 (May
15,
1997)
(statement
of
Rep.
Dart),
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans90/t051597.pdf (Representative Dart was a former State’s Attorney and is currently the Sheriff of Cook County).
35. Id. at 167-68.
36. Id. at 166-67. The first amendment to the Bill simply created the Act, while the
second amendment clarified some language to ensure the commitment proceedings were civil
in nature. Other than these, there were no debates on either the House or the Senate floor
regarding the Bill.
37. S.B. 6, 90th Ill. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess., Transcript of Senate Debate 25 (May
21,
1997)
(statement
of
Sen.
Watson),
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans90/ST052197.pdf.
38. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
39. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
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the person has already served prison time for a sexually violent crime.40 The
Department of Corrections (hereinafter the “DOC”), will send to the State’s
Attorney’s Office of the county where the offender was convicted notice that
the offender will be considered for commitment under the Act “not later than
6 months prior to the anticipated release” from incarceration.41 The State’s
Attorney’s office in turn notifies the Attorney General’s office. Then, either
office files a petition within three months of release from the DOC. 42 This
petition by the State must be filed within thirty days of release from incarceration.43 So, under the Act, a person can be found guilty of committing a
sexually violent offense, be sentenced to ten years in prison, serve nine years
and nine months of their full sentence, and then (after being found to be an
SVP), be involuntarily committed to the TDF at Rushville for an indeterminate amount of time. Their release from commitment depends upon the Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”), who is in charge of the
program.44 In order to commit a person under the Act, the State must show:
(1) The person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense;
...

40. 275 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added). Examples of a sexually violent offense under the Act are
criminal sexual assault (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20 (West, Westlaw through P.A.
99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)), aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11-1.30 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)), predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.40 (West, Westlaw through
P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)), criminal sexual abuse (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111.50 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)), aggravated criminal sexual
abuse (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.60 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.)), and indecent solicitation of a child (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-6 (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)). There are many more offenses included under the Act that would qualify as a sexually violent crime. Qualifying offenses can
vary widely; recently in Massachusetts, the state tried (and failed) to commit a 55-year-old
man under their SVP Act for being a habitual flasher. See Andrew Crouch, Supreme Judicial
Court Rejects Civil Commitment for Exhibitionist, BOS. SEX OFFENDER LAW REPORT (Sept.
17, 2011), http://bostonsexoffenderlaw.com/2011/09/17/supreme-judicial-court-rejects-civilcommitment-for-exhibitionist/.
41. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/9 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
42. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/15 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.). Typically, this is done by the Attorney General’s office.
43. Id.
44. This is one scenario. It is possible that the State can file a commitment petition at
any time during the inmate’s incarceration from within ninety days of their scheduled release
or, in theory, ninety days after their imprisonment begins. Typically, however, it is not until a
substantial amount of time after incarceration has lapsed that the State files the petition.
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(4) The person has a mental disorder.
(5) The person is dangerous to others because the
person’s mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in acts of sexual
violence.45
C.

COMMITMENT, TREATMENT, AND DISCHARGE UNDER THE
ACT
Abandon hope, all ye who enter here.46
-

Dante’s Inferno

Once committed to the TDF, the SVP is to remain committed for “control, care, and treatment” until he or she is no longer found to be a sexually
violent person.47
In theory, once committed under the statute, the SVP is to undergo treatment for their mental disorder(s), which typically include some sort of sexually-based disorder (such as pedophilia), as well as anti-social personality
disorder along with some sort of addiction-based disorder (such as alcohol
use disorder).
There are various avenues for release from the TDF. First, there is to be
an annual report by DHS to the court of the SVP’s current mental condition
to determine if enough progress has been made to release him or her.48 Additionally, the SVP can file a petition for conditional release, or the Secretary
of Human Services, whose role is fulfilled by the Director of the TDF, can
“authorize” the person to file a petition for conditional release if it is found
that he or she is no longer an SVP.49 Full release from the program requires
yet another petition.50 During the petition for release phase, the State has the
burden to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that the person is still an
SVP; if the State is successful, the person remains committed to TDF.51 The
45. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/15(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
46. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 5 (Lawrence Grant White trans., Pantheon Books, Inc. 1948).
47. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
48. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/55(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
49. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/55-65 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
50. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/65 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
51. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/60(d) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
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court looks at a variety of factors in determining if the resident qualifies for
release; however, it is mandated by the Act that the court consider:
(1) the person will be treated by a Department approved treatment provider, (2) the treatment provider has presented a specific course of treatment
and has agreed to assume responsibility for the
treatment and will report progress to the Department on a regular basis, and will report violations
immediately to the Department, consistent with
treatment and supervision needs of the respondent,
(3) housing exists that is sufficiently secure to protect the community, and the person or agency
providing housing to the conditionally released person has agreed in writing to accept the person, to
provide the level of security required by the court,
and immediately to report to the Department if the
person leaves the housing to which he or she has
been assigned without authorization, (4) the person
is willing to or has agreed to comply with the treatment provider, the Department, and the court, and
(5) the person has agreed or is willing to agree to
comply with the behavioral monitoring requirements imposed by the court and the Department.52
An SVP can petition the court for conditional release over the Director’s
objections.53 However, if they have previously filed such a petition, which
has been found to be “frivolous or that the person was still an [SVP],” then
in subsequent petitions the court can deny the petition without a hearing,
unless new facts are presented.54
Nine years after Illinois’s SVP Act took effect, the state had committed
169 people, had conditionally released eighteen, and fully released two people from the program.55 In 2005, the TDF had committed or detained 228
persons and conditionally released four people.56 By the next year, there were
271 persons who were committed or detained and six were released. In 2007,
52. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/60(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
53. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/60-65(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904
of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
54. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/65(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added) (this condition applies only for application of full release from the program).
55. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
56. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
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there were 307 committed or detained and the TDF released one.57 In 2008,
there were a total of 342 persons committed or detained, and the TDF released five; in 2009, 361 persons were committed or detained and three were
released.58 Three years later, in 2012, the TDF had 478 residents, and by the
next year (2013) there were 519 residents.59 As of November 2015, the TDF
had 561 committed residents.60 So, over a period of nine years—2006
through 2015—the number of residents at the TDF increased by 390 (roughly
forty-four per year). The TDF conditionally releases about three residents per
year (2005 through 2007), and in nine years (1998 through 2007) had only
released twenty people. Even the Senior Deputy and Chief of Clinical Operations for DHS, in 2013, stated that they “consistently” see forty to fifty new
residents per year and only “very few” people are conditionally released.61
As of 2013, the TDF was set for a $13 million expansion to increase its ability
to house even more SVPs.62
In a 2013 report by Michael Bednarz, the Illinois Department of Human
Services Forensic Medical Director, and Sharlene Caraway, the TDF Medical Director and Illinois Department of Human Services Associate Clinical
Director of the TDF, reported the average age of the residents at the TDF to
be forty-nine, with “many in their 70s and 80s.”63 In addition, since 1998,
thirty-two patients had died while they were either a resident of the TDF or
while they were on conditional release from the program.64 As of November
2015, there were 163 residents between the ages of eighteen and forty years
57. RUSHVILLE TREATMENT AND DETENTION FACILITY, STATE OF ILL. DEP’T OF
HUMAN SERVS., LIMITED SCOPE OF COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION 40 (2007), http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Compliance-Agency-List/DHS/Rushville-TDF/FY07Rushville-TDF-Comp-full.pdf. “Detained” is defined as “Residents who are held at the facility
based on the court’s preliminary judgment until their case is heard by the court.” Id.
58. RUSHVILLE TREATMENT AND DETENTION FACILITY, STATE OF ILL. DEP’T OF
HUMAN SERVS., LIMITED SCOPE OF COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION 31 (2009), http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Compliance-Agency-List/DHS/Rushville-TDF/FY09-DHSRushville-TDF-Comp-full.pdf.
59. STATE OF ILL. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION AND
DEPARTMENT-WIDE FINANCIAL AUDIT 58 (2011), http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Compliance-Agency-List/DHS/FY11-DHS-Fin-Comp-Full.pdf; see also, STATE OF ILL.
DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION AND DEPARTMENT-WIDE FINANCIAL
AUDIT 97 (2013), http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Compliance-AgencyList/DHS/FY13-DHS-Fin-Comp-Full.pdf.
60. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request, Illinois Department of Human
Services (Nov. 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Freedom of Information Request].
61. Jim Whitfield, More Patients Headed to Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, KHQA (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:43 PM), http://khqa.com/news/local/more-patients-headed-torushville-treatment-and-detention-center?id=857878.
62. Id. (the plan calls for an additional ninety-six beds).
63. Michael Bednarz & Sharlene Caraway, Managing End of Life and Age-Related
Health Issues in SVP Programs, at 6, on file with author.
64. Id. at 11.
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of age; 379 between the ages of forty-one and sixty-five; and nineteen residents between the ages of sixty-six and eighty-five.65

IV.
A.

SUCCESSFUL SVP PROGRAMS

THE SVP ACT AND TREATMENT IN NEW YORK

Named the “Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act,” New York
enacted its program in 2007.66 The State legislature recognized that there is
a risk to society from some sex offenders who have mental “abnormalities”
that may require specialized treatment and involuntary commitment.67 When
it appears to the county with jurisdiction that a sex offender will be soon
released from prison, it notifies the Attorney General’s office and the Mental
Health Commissioner.68 They send all records to a panel of fifteen people,
two of whom must be mental health professionals with experience in the
“treatment, diagnosis, risk assessment, or management of sex offenders,” to
look at all the information, including “medical, clinical, criminal, and institutional records,” and make a determination of whether or not the person
needs to be involuntarily committed.69 Once this determination is made, the
panel informs the Attorney General, who then files a petition to the court to
order involuntary commitment.70 In addition, the Commissioner of Mental
Health is to conduct an annual review to see if the resident still presents a
danger, and the resident himself can file a petition for conditional release. 71
If it is shown that the individual still presents a danger by “clear and convincing evidence,” the commitment continues.72
Since 2007, New York has managed to conditionally discharge 125 people and completely discharge another thirty without any recidivism.73

65. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60.
66. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01-.17 (McKinnney’s, Westlaw through L.2016,
chapters 1 to 396).
67. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinnney’s, Westlaw through L.2016, chapters 1 to 396).
68. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(b) (McKinnney’s, Westlaw through L.2016,
chapters 1 to 396).
69. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.05(a), (d) (McKinnney’s, Westlaw through
L.2016, chapters 1 to 396).
70. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(a) (McKinnney’s, Westlaw through L.2016,
chapters 1 to 396).
71. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.03(b), 10.09(b), 10.09(f) (McKinnney’s, Westlaw
through L.2016, chapters 1 to 396).
72. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09(h) (McKinnney’s, Westlaw through L.2016,
chapters 1 to 396).
73. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015).
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THE SVP ACT AND TREATMENT IN VIRGINIA

Virginia enacted its SVP law in 1999.74 Under their Act, there is a Commitment Review Committee (hereinafter “CRC”), who reports to the Director
of the DOC. The CRC evaluates and makes recommendations for involuntary
commitment.75 The committee is comprised of seven people; three full-time
DOC employees, three full-time employees of the Department of Behavioral
Health and Developmental Services (hereinafter “DBHDS”), at least one of
whom “shall be a psychiatrist or psychologist . . . who is skilled in the diagnosis and risk assessment of sex offenders and knowledgeable about the treatment of sex offenders;” and either an assistant or deputy general from the
Attorney General’s office.76 The Director of the DOC conducts monthly reviews of all prisoners who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense,
that are set to be released within ten months, and who have been tested and
received a certain score on an actuarial test which helps determine the prisoner’s recidivism risk.77 The Director notifies the CRC, who has an independent expert complete a further analysis of the prisoner.78 Once this analysis is done, the independent examiner can make the recommendation of
commitment, conditional release, or discharge from the DOC.79 At this point
a trial will occur, and if the person is found to be an SVP by clear and convincing evidence, they are handed over to the DBHDS for treatment.80
Once committed, the state reviews the resident’s mental health status
annually for the first five years, then biannually afterwards.81 An evaluation
is done with recommendations to assist the court in its ruling, and the resident
74. 1999 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 946 (LexisNexis). 1999 Va. ALS 946, 1999 Va. Acts
946, 1999 Va. Ch. 946, 1999 Va. SB 845.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-902(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-902(b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-903 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.). The most commonly used tests for assessment of sex offender risk are the STATIC-99,
STATIC-99R, and the STATIC-2002R. The STATIC-99 and STATIC-99R are outdated, but
are still widely used. See, e.g., STATIC99, http://www.static99.org/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2016)
(“[The] Static-99/R is the most widely used sex offender risk assessment instrument in the
world”).
78. This analysis includes a personal interview, a mental health exam, and a review
of all documents by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist who is not a member of the CRC,
and is skilled in sex offender assessments and treatments under VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-904(b)
(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-904(c), (d) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016
Reg. Sess.).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(a), (d) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016
Reg. Sess.).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-910(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
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may be conditionally released based on the court’s decision.82 Either the
Commissioner of the DBHDS can petition the court for conditional or complete release from the program, or the resident himself can make the petition
once a year.83 To be conditionally released, the court must find that:
(i) [The resident] does not need secure inpatient
treatment but needs outpatient treatment or monitoring to prevent his condition from deteriorating to
a degree that he would need secure inpatient treatment; (ii) appropriate outpatient supervision and
treatment are reasonably available; (iii) there is significant reason to believe that the respondent, if
conditionally released, would comply with the conditions specified; and (iv) conditional release will
not present an undue risk to public safety.84
The court makes this determination based on numerous factors, including the age of the resident, whether he can be effectively monitored to prevent
recidivism, if it is reasonably certain he will comply with the release conditions, and if he will not cause “an undue risk to public safety.”85
Since 1999, Virginia has conditionally released more than one hundred
residents after an average commitment time of fifty-four months.86
C.

THE SVP ACT AND TREATMENT IN WISCONSIN

In Wisconsin, the agency in charge of the inmate notifies the district
attorney as well as the Department of Justice of the qualified prisoner’s impending release.87 At trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the individual is an SVP.88 Individuals are then placed into the hands of
DHS in a secure mental health facility.89 Wisconsin is unique among the
other states examined herein, as by statute the resident is allowed off the
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-910(b)-(d) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016
Reg. Sess.).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-911(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.) (there is no required judicial review if the resident files the petition).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-912(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
85. Id.
86. Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
87. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.015 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392, published
April 27, 2016) (the notification is within ninety days of the person’s discharge).
88. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392, published
April 27, 2016).
89. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.06-980.065 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392, published April 27, 2016).
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grounds of the facility, as long as they are under escort—no other state examined for this Note provides such a privilege by statute.90 As with other
states, an annual report and review is conducted by the treatment facility and
the court.91 Once committed, the resident may petition for release from the
program every twelve months, and can be released if the court finds that:
1. The person is making significant progress in
treatment and the person’s progress can be sustained while on supervised release.
2. It is substantially probable that the person will not
engage in an act of sexual violence while on supervised release.
3. Treatment that meets the person’s needs and a
qualified provider of the treatment are reasonably
available.
4. The person can be reasonably expected to comply
with his or her treatment requirements and with all
of his or her conditions or rules of supervised release that are imposed by the court or by the department.
5. A reasonable level of resources can provide for
the level of residential placement, supervision, and
ongoing treatment needs that are required for the
safe management of the person while on supervised
release.92
In addition, DHS may file an updated record at any time with the court,
and the court may also order a re-evaluation at any time.93
Since 1994, Wisconsin has conditionally released roughly 150 residents
from their SVP program.94

90. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.067 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392, published
April 27, 2016) (emphasis added).
91. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.07(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392, published
April 27, 2016).
92. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.08(1), (4)(cg) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392,
published April 27, 2016).
93. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.07(3), (7) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392, published April 27, 2016).
94. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (E.D. Mo. 2015); see also
Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015).
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So, states can have SVP laws, even ones with very similar language to
Illinois’s Act, provide meaningful treatment to those committed, and successfully release them back into society.95 We will now examine some states
where, while this has been the intention, in practice they fall far short.

V. UNSUCCESSFUL SVP PROGRAMS
The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government.96
- Thomas Jefferson
A.

THE SVP ACT AND TREATMENT IN MINNESOTA

Recently, a U.S. District Court judge ruled that Minnesota’s SVP Act
was unconstitutional.97 Under Minnesota’s SVP Act, a petition is filed with
the court to have the offender committed.98 Once it is determined by “clear
and convincing evidence” that the person is a sexually dangerous person,
they are committed for an “indeterminate period of time.”99 To be committed
to the Minnesota Sexual Offender Program (hereinafter “MSOP”), it must be
shown that the person “(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct
. . . (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder . . . and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.”100 A
petition for release from the MSOP may be brought by either the resident or
the director, and it goes before a special review board.101 They in turn give
their recommendation to the court, which makes the final determination of a

95. Additionally, as of 2006, Arizona had released sixty-nine persons conditionally
and a further eighty-one completely since it enacted its program in 1995, and had only seventyone residents in their SVP program at that time. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
96. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to The Republican Citizens of Washington County, Maryland, Assembled at Hagerstown on the 6th Instant, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON:
BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER
WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 165 (H.A Washington ed., Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2011).
97. See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015).
98. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.07 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
99. Id.
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.02 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.27 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
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reduction in custody.102 By statute, anyone can oppose the petition.103 The
court bases its determination on the recommendation of the special review
board to determine whether the person’s mental status still requires commitment, and whether discharge will provide adequate safeguards to the public
as well as helping the offender be successful.104 In early challenges to Minnesota’s SVP Act, attorneys for the State told the courts at the time that the
“MSOP was an approximately thirty-two-month program for ‘model patients.’”105 Since 1994, Minnesota had committed just over seven hundred
people to the MSOP, had never fully discharged anyone from the program,
and conditionally discharged three.106
The residents in MSOP brought a class action suit against the Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services, stating that Minnesota’s SVP
Act is unconstitutional as written and as applied.107 The judge in this case
stated that in order to comply with the very narrow standard outlined in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Act must “ensure that individuals are committed no
longer than necessary to serve the state’s . . . interests.”108 The judge also held
that
[c]onfinement under civil commitment at the
MSOP is constitutional only if the state determines
and confirms that the basis for commitment still exists . . .. It is constitutionally mandated that only individuals who constitute a ‘real, continuing, and serious danger to society’ may continue to be civilly
committed to the MSOP.109
He went on to note that “[t]he purpose for which an individual is civilly
committed to the MSOP is to provide treatment to and protect the public from
individuals who are both mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the
public as a result of that mental illness,”110 and that the State “has failed to
demonstrate that . . . [Minnesota’s SVP Act] is narrowly tailored to achieve
its compelling interests.”111 The judge found that the Act violated this strict
102.
Sess.).
103.
104.
Sess.).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.28 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.30 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015).
Id. at 1144, 1147.
Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1170 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997)).
See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1168 (D. Minn. 2015).
Id.
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standard for a number of reasons, one of which was because residents remain
committed even though they have “completed treatment, can no longer benefit from treatment, or have reduced their risk below the . . . standard.”112
Another reason the SVP Act was unconstitutional was that:
[A]lthough treatment is made available, there is no
meaningful relationship between the treatment program at the MSOP and discharge from custody. Progression through the phases of treatment at the
MSOP has been so slow, for so many years, that
treatment has never been a way out of confinement
for committed individuals . . . The treatment program has been plagued by a lack of funding, staff
shortages, and periodic alterations in the treatment
program . . . The overall failure of the treatment program over so many years is evidence of the punitive
effect and application of [commitment].113
Lastly, the judge also noted that the Act was not narrowly tailored
enough because the statute did not “require the state to take any affirmative
action, such as petition for reduction of custody, on behalf of individuals who
no longer satisfy the criteria for continued commitment.”114 This results in a
“fatal flaw” and a “punitive effect . . . contrary to civil commitment.”115 Nor
did the statute give any judicial bypass mechanism in the event of an emergency or a way for a resident to obtain release in a reasonable time period;
not even a habeas corpus petition was considered fast enough in the judge’s
opinion.116
Minnesota must now make “substantial changes” to their SVP program.117 The state must conduct a re-evaluation of all residents and see who
qualifies for conditional release, and place remaining residents into the
proper treatment phase.118 This will surely cost the state a vast sum now that

112. Id. at 1171.
113. Id. at 1172.
114. Id. at 1169.
115. See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1169 (D. Minn. 2015) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997)). There were additional reasons the court found,
but those reasons will not be explored in this Note.
116. Id. at 1168.
117. Id. at 1176.
118. Id. at 1176-78.
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they have been ordered by a judge to do what they should have been doing
all along.119
B.

THE SVP ACT AND TREATMENT IN MISSOURI

Missouri has experienced some similar issues as Minnesota with their
SVP Act, as a federal judge has declared that Missouri’s SVP Act violated
the Due Process Clause. The “overwhelming evidence at trial” showed that
Missouri’s Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (hereinafter
“MO SORTS”) “suffers from systemic failures regarding risk assessment and
release that have resulted in the continued confinement of individuals who
no longer meet the criteria for commitment.”120
Under the Missouri SVP Act, notice is given to the Attorney General’s
office by the DOC 360 days prior to the offender’s release.121 A multidisciplinary team, consisting of “at least one member from the [DOC] and the
Department of Mental Health,” along with five others, evaluate whether or
not the individual meets the definition of an SVP.122 (The definition of an
SVP under Missouri’s Act is “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes [them] more likely than not to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence if not confined” and who has been found guilty of a sexually violent offense).123 This committee then submits a report to the Attorney General’s office, which then files a petition to the court to have the person committed.124 If found to be an SVP, the person is then transferred to the
custody of the Department of Mental Health (hereinafter “DMH”) for commitment for their “control, care, and treatment until such time as the person’s
mental abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.”125

119. See id. at 1174. The judge in this case was U.S. District Judge Donovan W. Frank,
a former Minnesota District judge and Assistant County Attorney. He recognized in his opinion his obligation to the rights and safety of the citizens of the State, but that he also had to
weigh the interests of justice because “Due Process forecloses the substitution of preventative
detention schemes for the criminal justice system, and the judiciary has a constitutional duty
to intervene before civil commitment becomes the norm” (quoting In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d
171, 181 (Minn. 1996)).
120. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 844 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
121. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.483(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
122. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.483(4) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
124. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.486 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg. Sess.
and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
125. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495(2) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
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An annual review is performed, at which time either the Director or the resident may petition the court for conditional release.126 If the petition had been
initiated by the resident over the Director’s objections and he or she was not
released, subsequent petitions by the resident may be denied without review
unless new facts are presented to justify a change in status.127 The Act provides twenty-one conditions that the offender must comply with, including
submitting to a plethysmograph, GPS electronic monitoring, paying fees for
that monitoring, and to comply with “any other conditions . . . in the best
interest of the person and society.”128
The Missouri SVP Act was found to be unconstitutional, both facially
and substantively. The Missouri court held this way in part because there
were internal emails of MO SORTS presented from 2009 that identified fifteen of the residents who could be conditionally released from the program
due to their age (they were over sixty-five), progress in the treatment program, and their infirm state, yet their lower recidivism risk was not noted in
their annual reviews, and they remained at MO SORTS.129 Additionally, the
Director of the DMH had not authorized one MO SORTS resident to petition
for conditional release since the Act was passed sixteen years earlier.130 In
fact, MO SORTS had not conditionally released anyone from the program
since it was enacted.131 The court went on to note that the lack of MO SORTS
to release anyone from the program had resulted in pervasive hopelessness
among both residents and staff, which is “counter-therapeutic and impedes
the treatment progress of . . . residents.”132
Even the program coordinator at one of the MO SORTS facilities admitted, “the ‘logical conclusion’ is that treatment is a ‘sham.’” 133 The court
126. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.498(1), (2) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016
Reg. Sess. and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
127. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.504 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Reg. Sess.
and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.).
128. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.505(3), (13), (14), (18), (21) (West, Westlaw through the
end of the 2016 Reg. Sess. and Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.). A penis plethysmograph,
or PPG, is an electronic device placed on the genitalia. The offender is then shown various
provocative photographs, and the machine attempts to monitor any type of arousal response.
This test, which seems on its face to be a lot like medieval quackery or a sophisticated torture
device, has been shown to be easily defeated. A Florida SVP stated he passed the test by
reading the labels of cleaning supply products on the shelf while it was being administered.
See, Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, For Sex Offenders, a Dispute Over Therapy’s Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2007), www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/us/06civil.html?pagewanted=all.
129. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 853-54 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
130. Id. at 854.
131. Id. at 856. Two residents were conditionally released from MO SORTS, but they
were released with no involvement or help by MO SORTS or the DMH. Id.
132. Id. at 859.
133. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 859 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
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found that there are “deficiencies in risk assessment, procedures for release,
and community reintegration” at MO SORTS.134 The court noted that while
residents “may not have a constitutional right to treatment, they do have a
constitutional right to avoid undue confinement.”135 The judge concluded that
the “risk assessment and release procedures . . . are wholly deficient” due to
refusing to recommend for release those who no longer meet the dangerous
requirement.136 Specifically, he found that not properly implementing community reintegration requirements for the residents violated the resident’s
rights under the Due Process Clause (remarking here that this stated goal is
“observed in theory but not in practice”137 and that “while the treatment program itself is not a sham, the release portion of the program is.”138). In addition, the judge stated that the release procedures, which were not being followed with what was outlined by the Act or the Due Process Clause, MO
SORTS instituted a release procedure that is “futile in practice.”139
These reasons led the court to rule that “the director’s failure to comply
with the SVP Act has resulted in the continued confinement of persons who
no longer meet the criteria for commitment, and amounts to unconstitutional
punishment.”140 Of special note is the judge stating that:
The Court believes that Plaintiffs’ [the residents]
rights to a system that includes proper risk assessment and release are rights protected by the constitutional guarantee of liberty, not merely state law.
But even if these rights were grounded solely in
state law, as Defendants appear to argue, the Court
would find that Defendants’ nearly complete failure
to protect them . . . is so arbitrary as to shock the
conscience. The Constitution does not allow Defendants to impose lifetime detention on individuals
who have completed their prison sentences and who
no longer pose a danger to the public, no matter how
heinous their past conduct. ‘[M]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.’ Nor may

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 862.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 868.
See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 868 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
Id. at 869.
Id.
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the [MO] SORTS residents’ liberty interests be ignored because it is politically expedient to do so.141
Missouri now faces a similar situation to Minnesota, and after spending
taxpayer money to defend an Act that has now been found to be unconstitutional, must pick up the pieces and comply with the court ordered remedies.142

VI.

HOW ILLINOIS’S SVP ACT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

There is no tyranny more cruel than that which is perpetrated under [the shield] of the laws and in the name of justice.143
- Charles de Montesquieu
A.

EVALUATIONS AND PETITIONS FOR CONDITIONAL
RELEASE

At the annual review, an evaluator determines if the resident’s status has
changed and then files a report, which is then given to both the DHS and the
court.144 If the evaluator recommends conditional release, then the Director
must file with the court “his or her intention whether or not to petition for
conditional release on the committed person’s behalf.”145 So, the evaluator
for the TDF can recommend release, and the Director can still try to fight and
keep the person committed at the TDF.146 That is a rather sweeping power of
control over someone’s liberty that is placed in the hands of a private entity,
especially considering that, without the approval of the Director, the chances
of obtaining conditional release are greatly reduced. This seems an awful lot
like Missouri, where the judge in that case found the treatment program
141. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 869-870 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
142. Id. at 870-71. As of this writing, those remedies have yet to be determined.
143. CHARLES DE SECONDAT & BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
CAUSES OF THE GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE OF THE ROMANS: A NEW TRANSLATION 279 (Jehu
Baker trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1889) (“There is no tyranny more cruel than that which is
perpetrated under color of the laws and in the name of justice – when, so to speak, one is
drawn down and drowned by means of the very plank which should have borne him up and
saved his life.”).
144. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/55 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
145. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/60(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
146. Id. Currently, treatment services are being provided by Liberty Healthcare Corporation.
See,
e.g.,
job
posting
from
August
20th
located
at
https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/194276949 (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).

24

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

8.1

“wholly deficient” in part due to the Director refusing to recommend residents for conditional release when they are no longer dangerous.147 The possibility certainly exists that such an abuse can occur since the Director, by
statute, can deny a person’s ability to be conditionally released despite an
evaluator recommending them to be; there is the potential for continued commitment even though there has been a showing that the resident no longer
meets the criteria.148 This dangerous line was easily crossed in Missouri, in
violation of the Due Process Clause.
B.

THE NUMBERS OF RESIDENTS RELEASED DO NOT HOLD UP

In comparison to Illinois, by 2007 Arizona had committed seventy-one
people since 1995, conditionally released sixty-nine, and fully released
eighty-one.149 California (since 1995) had committed 443 persons, conditionally released three people, and had fully released fifty-nine.150 Wisconsin,
since they enacted their SVP Act in 1994, had committed 283 people, conditionally released 17 and fully discharged 26.151 Does this mean offenders are
harder to treat in Illinois compared to other states? Why are other states able
to have treatment programs that are actually treating their SVPs and Illinois
is unable to do so? Admittedly, Illinois has released more residents (twentyeight in eleven years),152 than Minnesota (three in twenty years)153 and Missouri (zero in sixteen years),154 but the numbers are nowhere the same as Arizona (150 in eleven years),155 New York (155 in eight years),156 Virginia
(over 100 in sixteen years),157 or Wisconsin (150 in twenty-one years).158 In
the same amount of time (eleven years), Arizona managed to release over ten
times the number of SVP’s from commitment than Illinois, with a 2.3% recidivism rate, which is only one-tenth of a percent lower than that of Illinois.159 Having a terrible treatment program, regardless of the reason (such
as lack of funding or a high turnaround for personnel),160 is not a good enough
147. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
148. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/60(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added).
149. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
150. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
151. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
152. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15; RUSHVILLE TREATMENT AND DETENTION
FACILITY, supra note 56; STATE OF ILL. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 57.
153. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147-48 (D. Minn. 2015).
154. See Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
155. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 15.
156. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
157. See Van Orden, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
158. See id.
159. See Orchowsky & Iwama, supra note 32.
160. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1158.
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excuse to be allowed to tear up the Constitution and deprive a person, any
person, of their freedom of liberty.161
In addition, the TDF currently has nineteen residents over the age of
sixty-six, and 379 more residents between the ages of forty-one and sixtyfive.162 This will be examined in greater detail later in this Note,163 but it is
enough to say at this point that the recidivism risk drops gradually as the
offender ages, to the point of zero risk at age sixty.164
C.

ILLINOIS’S SVP ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE STATE OR
THE COURTS ANY RECOURSE FOR REDUCING
COMMITMENT

Just as in Minnesota, Illinois’s SVP Act does not give the state any definite option to petition the court to reduce or modify the commitment conditions of the residents. Nor is any resolution given to the judiciary. In Minnesota, this finding led the court to declare that the Act was not narrowly tailored enough under strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional, as the “statute’s
failure to require the state to petition for individuals who no longer pose a
danger to the public and no longer need inpatient treatment and supervision
for a sexual disorder.”165 In addition, the court found that the failure of the
Minnesota Act to give the courts a timely avenue or to provide an alternative
mechanism likewise violated Due Process.166 This is particularly pressing, as
DNA exonerations happen with increasing frequency.
Suppose, for example, a person is convicted of a sexually violent offense, and they are duly sent to prison, spend their time behind bars, and then
are committed under the Act. After ten years in prison and another five years
at the TDF, the State’s Attorney’s office learns, through a confession by another individual and DNA evidence, that someone else was the one who committed the offense, not the resident currently in TDF. It is certain the State
will prosecute the true offender, but the State now has no avenue by statute
to release the resident in the TDF, nor is there anything that allows a court on
their own initiative to issue a release from commitment.
In such a scenario, the committed individual would have to first get a
new hearing (if possible), have his conviction vacated, and then be successful
in his own petition to the court for his release from the clutches of the TDF

161. Van Orden, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 850-51 (citing Strutton v. Meade, No.
4:05CV02022 ERW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31944 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2010)).
162. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60.
163. See discussion infra Part VIII, Section A of this Note.
164. See infra notes 181-82.
165. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169.
166. Id. at 1169-70.
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– all while he is involuntarily committed at the TDF. There would be no reason for the state to fight the petition for release in such a scenario, but there
is nothing by statute that compels them to do so.167 If they have not been
found guilty of committing a sexually violent offense, the Due Process
Clause mandates that they can no longer be involuntarily committed.
Currently, the best the statute can provide in such a situation is that “[a]
person may petition the committing court for discharge from custody or supervision without the [Director’s] approval.”168 Despite being vague, the
word “may” does not mandate such a petition, which is what was stated in
the ruling in Karsjens v. Jesson.169
The way the State of Illinois is implementing its SVP Act is almost
identical to Minnesota and Missouri. All three states have residents who must
have completed treatment to the point that they no longer present a danger to
society. All three states have residents who are close to or over the age of
sixty, they all have a treatment program that is, as applied, “a sham,” as other
State programs can release ten times as many as Illinois with a low rate of
recidivism (Arizona, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin). Minnesota and
Illinois both lack a statutory avenue of redress for either the state or the judiciary, and all three states are not fully utilizing conditional release or other
less restrictive options for those residents who are no longer dangerous. Despite this almost identical implementation between Minnesota and Missouri,
all the states examined have similar scientific numbers that show the recidivism rate is generally low to begin with and decreases as the resident gets
older and/or receives treatment.170

VII.

WHERE DOES ILLINOIS GO FROM HERE?

All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though
the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to
be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess
their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression.171
- Thomas Jefferson
167. In a change to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct Article
VIII, Rule 3.8, effective Jan. 1st 2016, prosecutors “shall seek to remedy the conviction” when
there is new evidence that the person was wrongfully convicted. ILL. SUP. CT. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT art. VIII, r. 3.8 (2016).
168. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/65(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (this would be for full release, not conditional release).
169. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169-70.
170. See infra notes 181-82.
171. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 298 (Adrienne Koch &
William Peden eds., Random House Publisher, Inc. 1944).
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TANTALUS, REVISITED

I began this Note with the story of Tantalus, who was eternally punished
by the gods. While those committed under Illinois’s SVP Act may seem to
some to deserve eternal punishment, the State does not get to play Zeus, the
supreme lord, in this story, controlling human life and destiny with no one to
challenge his decisions.172 The State also does not get to release the Erinyes
from the underworld to take divine justice and avenge horrible wrongs.173 No
state gets a free pass to crush a person’s constitutional rights simply because
the person has committed some disgusting act—such retribution is better left
to totalitarian regimes, or, perhaps, to gods long since faded from memory.
To be involuntarily committed to the TDF at Rushville requires three
things: that the person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, that
they have a mental disorder, and that their mental disorder makes them a
danger to others because they are likely to re-offend and commit more sexually violent crimes.174 The removal of any one of these three requirements
means the State no longer has any right to involuntarily commit someone,
and continued commitment would violate a person’s Due Process right to be
free from discretionary action by the government. “[W]ith these statutory and
constitutional requirements, when the standard for discharge is satisfied, the
state has no authority to continue detaining the confined individual . . . .”175
B.

THE EVIL THAT MEN DO

There is no question that those who are involuntarily committed have
been found guilty of serious, offensive crimes. They have done horrible and
repugnant things. Mr. Hendricks, for example, had been convicted of molesting little children, one as young as seven years old.176 He even stated at one
point that the only time he didn’t molest children was when he was incarcerated, and that he would probably never stop until he died.177 There is, right
now, a resident in the TDF who was convicted of molesting two eight-year-

172. A. H. PETISCUS, THE GODS OF OLYMPOS: OR MYTHOLOGY OF THE GREEKS AND
ROMANS 19-21 (Katherine A. Raleigh trans., Paternoster Square, T. Fisher Unwin 20th ed.
2014) (1892).
173. Id. at 167-68 (the Erinyes were avenging goddesses sent to punish and torment
people who had committed great evils, from whom no one could escape).
174. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/15(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
175. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1170 (D. Minn. 2015) (emphasis
added).
176. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1997).
177. Id. at 355.
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old girls.178 Another was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a minor
when he raped his six-year-old niece.179 These people are what the rest of us
would call; a monster or a boogeyman. They are the source of a terrific
amount of fear in society, and are easily heaped with scorn, derision, and
hatred, especially those who have committed offenses against a child. To find
any sort of sympathy for these devils is a monumental task. Yet, if there is
no harm presented, then the offender is reduced to a boogeyman, and the
boogeyman is not real. It can be very easy to lock these people up, throw
away the key, and forget about them. To defend the reprehensible and do
what is right is what separates a civil society from tyranny, and “[i]njustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”180

VIII.

SO WHAT DOES ILLINOIS DO?

There is little doubt these people pose a risk to society and that they
need to receive treatment in a controlled environment before they can be reintegrated back into society. But Illinois is not providing this in a manner that
is in conformity with the Due Process Clause. So how do we fix Illinois’s
SVP Program so that it conforms to the Constitution and does not violate a
resident’s Due Process rights? How do we prevent a fate similar to that of
Minnesota and Missouri from crashing down on Illinois?
A.

RELEASE FOR THOSE COMMITTED ONCE THEY REACH
SIXTY YEARS OF AGE

A substantial number of studies have been done that suggest that the
recidivism risk for sex offenders, regardless of the type of offense they have
committed, is very low after the age of sixty.181 The one study I have found
178. I cannot name this person due to confidentiality reasons involving my experience
as an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 711 intern at the Public Defender’s Office in DeKalb
County, Illinois.
179. Id.
180. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, UNIV. OF PENN.,
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2016).
181. See generally, R. Karl Hanson, Age and Sexual Recidivism: A Comparison of
Rapists and Child Molesters, DEP’T. OF THE SOLIC. GEN. CAN. 9 (2001), https://www.securitepublique.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/sxl-rcdvsm-cmprsn/sxl-rcdvsm-cmprsn-eng.pdf [hereinafter Age and Sexual Recidivism] (“There were very few recidivists among the sexual offenders released after age 60 (. . . 3.8%).”). These were all intra-familial molesters; “None of the
[extra-familial molesters] or rapists who were over 60 at the time of release recidivated.” Id.
See also David Thornton, Age and Sexual Recidivism: A Variable Connection, 18 SEXUAL
ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 123, 133 (2006) (“For these already highly repetitive sexual
offenders the effect of age is best characterized as involving an initial very high sexual recidivism rate for those released between 18 and 25, a substantial reduction in this rate (from about
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that shows there may be a risk after sixty has some real issues, namely that
the sample size was painfully small (265 total subjects), and even then the
risk it presented after the age of sixty was very low (0% for rapists and just
over 16.5% for child molesters).182 If the science is to be believed at the beginning of the process—involuntarily committing these people—then it
should also be equally believed at the end of the process when it comes to
release. The State should, at the very least, conditionally release any resident
at the TDF who is over this defining age. In addition, releasing these aging
residents of the TDF would help alleviate some of the substantial costs involved in committing them.183 In 2015, there were at least nineteen residents
over the age of sixty-five who should qualify for conditional release due to
the lower, if not non-existent, recidivism risk associated with age.184 If they
no longer present a danger to society due to their age, the Due Process Clause
mandates that they cannot continue to be involuntarily committed and should
be released.
Likewise, those residents that have become so infirm that the risk of
recidivism has become small (like Mr. Hendricks, confined to a wheelchair)
could also be conditionally released.185 If they no longer present a danger to
80% to just under 50%) for offenders released after that age, with no subsequent decline in
sexual recidivism until the age of 60 when the rate again falls by about 40 percentage points.”).
This would give a recidivism risk after sixty of less than 10%. See R. Karl Hanson, The Validity of Static-99 with Older Sexual Offenders, PUB. SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
CANADA (2005) (“The 5 year recidivism rates of offenders over 60 was only 2% . . . .”); R.
Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data from 4,673 Sexual Offenders, 17 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046, 1054 (2002) (“There were very few recidivists among the
sexual offenders released after age 60 (5 of 131 or 3.8%). The older-than-60 recidivists included two extra-familial child molesters (2 of 45 or 4.4%) and three unclassified offenders
(3 of 37 or 8.1%). None of the incest offenders . . . or rapists . . . released after age 60 recidivated.”).
182. Robert Alan Prentky & Austin F. S. Lee, Effect of Age-at-Release on Long Term
Sexual Re-offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders, 19 SPRINGER SCI. & BUS.
MEDIA, LLC PG (2007). It should be noted that the risk of recidivism in this study grouped all
child molesters into one class, while most studies differentiate between extra-familial molesters and intra-familial molesters. So, for this study, there is no way of determining what the reoffense rate is between these two groups, but other studies that separate child molesters into
the separate groupings show that intra-familial molesters typically have a much lower recidivism risk that extra-familial molesters. See supra note 32. In comparing the sample size of this
study to those mentioned in notes 32 and 181, the study done by R. Karl Hanson (Age and
Sexual Recidivism: A Comparison of Rapists and Child Molesters) had a sample size of 4,673;
the study by David Thornton (Age and Sexual Recidivism: A Variable Connection) had a sample size of 752; the second study by R. Karl Hanson (The Validity of Static-99 With Older
Sexual Offenders) had a sample size of 3,425; and the third study by R. Karl Hanson (Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data From 4,673 Sexual Offenders) had a sample size of 4,673.
See supra notes 32, 181.
183. See infra Part VIII, Section D of this Note.
184. See Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60.
185. See supra note 28.
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society due to an infirmity, Due Process requires that they cannot continue to
be involuntarily committed and they should be released.
B.

RE-EMPHASIS ON CONDITIONAL RELEASE

A resident of TDF who qualifies for conditional release faces some incredible challenges, but it would be hard to argue that they are not very well
controlled. They must comply with fifty-seven conditions at all times, and a
violation of any one will result in the revocation of their conditional release
and land them back in the TDF.186 Some of these conditions make sense, such
as registering as a sex offender, having a twenty-four hour GPS tracking device placed on them,187 the continuation of treatment and therapy,188 and the
total prohibition for them to possess pornography.189 Some of the conditions
are somewhat understandable, but difficult just the same, such as being unable to purchase pay-per-view movies (regardless of their rating or content),190
not being allowed to possess a smart phone,191 or being unable to have internet access.192 Still others are almost unbearably harsh, when one truly thinks
about them, such as the ban from joining any health or fitness clubs (including the YMCA),193 owning a pet,194 or making any purchases without prior
approval from either the Case Management Team (those in charge of monitoring SVPs on release) or the Director, and after a purchase has been made
they must turn in their receipts.195 Even guests to their home must be preapproved by their Case Management Team.196 The number and nature of at
least some of these conditions appear to be far more punitive than therapeutic, which would violate the Due Process Clause.
Illinois needs to re-evaluate committed residents to see if they meet the
qualifications for conditional release—surely there must be some who have
completed a substantial part of the treatment program that can function within
society and be effectively controlled and present a low risk of re-offending.197
186. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60.
187. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 56.
188. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 6.
189. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 20.
190. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 42.
191. Freedom of Information Act Request supra note 60, at No. 26.
192. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 33.
193. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 46.
194. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 45.
195. Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 54.
196. See Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 60, at No. 50.
197. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 2016 IL App (5th) 150213-U (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
2016). (Larry Paul Moore was incarcerated from 1977 until 2011, whereupon he was found to
be a SVP and then sent to the TDF at Rushville, where he remains. While it could be argued
that he has not yet received an adequate amount of treatment to be conditionally released, he
has been in prison or committed for the last thirty-nine years. If he was eighteen when he went

2016]

RESPITE FOR TANTALUS

31

Or at the very least, these residents should qualify for continued treatment at
a less secure and restrictive facility, something that does not exist in Illinois.
If they no longer present a danger to society due to the conditions of their
release and from completing a large portion of the treatment program, Due
Process dictates that they cannot continue to be involuntarily committed, and
that they should be released.
C.

RE-EVALUATE THE PROCEDURES FOR GRANTING
CONDITIONAL RELEASE

There needs to be an avenue for the State to petition the court for a person’s release, as well as for the courts to act on their own initiative. As it
stands right now, this is left up to DHS or the resident themselves, but the
State has no recourse in the statute. In addition, the Director should be removed from the decision process. This goes back to an earlier point regarding
the Director’s ability to block those residents who have been recommended
for conditional release. The Director can effectively stop the conditional release of residents when they have been found to satisfy the requirements for
release, and this is potentially a huge problem that could very well violate a
resident’s Due Process rights.198 When one is talking about a program that is
run by a private entity and has an annual budget in the tens of millions, there
can be little motivation to see residents leave the program.199
Further, the statistics presented do not make a convincing argument that
Illinois is not committing people past the time that they need to be in order
to protect society, not in light of the recidivism risks and success rates of
other states with similar Acts.200 The fact that a recent independent study
found that Illinois’s recidivism rate was as low as 2.4% should demand that
the process of determining conditional release be heavily scrutinized in the
face of so few residents being released.201 If they no longer present a danger
to society due to their low risk of recidivism, then in light of the conditions
of their release, the State can hardly be justified in continued commitment.
Due Process would then warrant their release from commitment.

to prison in 1977, he would be fifty-seven now. The State has had almost four decades to
rehabilitate him, and he is approaching age sixty).
198. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/60(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-904 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
199. Currently, the Clinical Director at the TDF is Dr. Shan Jumper, Ph.D. Leadership
Board, SOCCPN, http://soccpn.org/leadership-board/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
200. See supra Section VI, Part B.
201. Orchowsky & Iwama, supra note 32.
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A RE-EVALUATION OF THE COST

The cost of involuntarily committing a person at the TDF is roughly
$53,000.00 per year.202 The cost of incarceration in prison per inmate is
$31,286.00 annually.203 Commitment is a big expense for a state that couldn’t
even pay its own lottery winners,204 much less continues to have on-going
budget problems that have resulted in the state’s credit rating being listed at
just barely above “junk status.”205 Taxpayers in Illinois are paying a high
price for such a poor return on investment; from a strict business standpoint,
they must pay an additional $2.3 million to commit forty-four new residents
a year while only subtracting $158,847 for the three that are annually released, and they are still paying in part for those since there are costs involved
for continued treatment and monitoring. Some inmates in prison can earn a
GED or college-level degree, receive counseling for substance abuse, obtain
job training, receive anger management classes, and even take parenting classes while incarcerated. With the cost differential so disproportionate, the
State could reduce this cost by beginning treatment for these offenders while
they are still in prison.206 This would have the added effect of possibly releasing them from the TDF earlier, if not getting them to the point of not
needing to be committed at all, going straight from prison to conditional release and avoiding Due Process issues altogether. Instead of throwing money
at the problem for expansion, the State would be better served by using those
funds to improve the quality of the treatment residents receive and starting
treatment while they were in prison. That way, there would be no need for
202. See STATE OF ILL. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION AND
DEPARTMENT-WIDE FINANCIAL AUDIT 97 (2013), http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Compliance-Agency-List/DHS/FY13-DHS-Fin-Comp-Full.pdf (the expenditures for
FY 2013, as determined by the State’s Auditor General’s Office, were $27,480,687).
203. Prison Overcrowding Threatens Public Safety and State Budgets, AM.
LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL (2015), https://www.alec.org/article/prison-overcrowdingthreatens-public-safety-state-budgets/.
204. Aamer Madhani, Illinois Gives Lottery Winners IOUs, USA TODAY (Oct. 15,
2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/10/14/cash-strapped-illinoisgives-ious-to-lottery-winners/73960268/.
205. Tom Schuba, Moody’s Downgrades Illinois’ Credit Rating Amid Budget Crisis,
NBC CHIC. (June 9, 2016, 12:36 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/wardroom/Moodys-Downgrades-Illinois-Credit-Rating-Amid-Budget-Crisis-382378591.html;
Heather Gillers, S&P Downgrades Illinois, Fitch Puts Ratings on Negative Watch, WALL ST.
J. (June 9, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/s-p-downgrades-illinois-fitch-putsratings-on-negative-watch-1465505931.
206. These are some of the services that an inmate can receive at the Sheridan Correctional Facility. This comes partly from personal knowledge that I gained while performing my
duties as a Supreme Court Rule 711 intern for the Public Defender’s Office in DeKalb County,
Illinois. Information can also be obtained from the Sheridan Correctional Facility website. See
SHERIDAN CORR. CENTER, ILL. DEP’T OF CORRS., http://www.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/pages/sheridancorrectionalcenter.aspx (last updated July 1, 2015).
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expansion if the treatment program was more in line with states that have
successful programs, such as Arizona, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin.207 If their mental disorder has been treated enough so they no longer present a danger to society, they cannot continue to be involuntarily committed
under the Due Process Clause.
E.

REMOVE THE BIAS OF THE EVALUATIONS

The DHS hands the offenders off to the TDF, which in turn contracts
the running of the facility and treatment to a private company.208 A private
company has little, if any, motivation to implement a successful treatment
program—the more residents, the more money thrown their way.209 One can
hardly imagine that the annual reviews and recommendations to the court by
the TDF are unbiased.210 Just as in New York or Virginia, where a committee
evaluates the offender to determine the need for commitment, the State
should have an independent psychiatrist or psychologist (or even a board or
committee) make the annual evaluation and the court should base their determination on this one expert evaluation (along with the totality of the circumstances, which would include a report from TDF).211 This would eliminate
the “battle of the experts” who are motivated to spin their testimony and reports for their own benefit. It would also put at least one portion of the hearing in the hands of an unencumbered, objective outsider, thus helping to
avoid continued commitment for those who no longer present a danger and
violating the resident’s Due Process rights.212
207. See supra Part IV.
208. Currently, this contract is being fulfilled by Liberty Healthcare Corporation. Sex
Offender Management & Treatment, LIBERTY HEALTHCARE CORP., http://www.libertyhealthcare.com/programs/for-government-or-public-sector/sex-offender-management-andtreatment/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
209. See Whitfield, supra note 61.
210. I have witnessed this bias while interning for the Public Defender’s Office of
DeKalb County, Illinois. A report generated by the State’s expert quoted from a study the
recidivism risk percentages for rapists (17.1%) and extra-familial molesters (19.7%) while
omitting the risk percentage for the offender in the case, who was an intra-familial molester
(8.4%). See Age and Sexual Recidivism, supra note 181. One can only assume that the reason
for this discrepancy was because the percentages given in the study for rapists and extra-familial molesters was higher than that for intra-familial molesters and made for a better argument to keep the resident committed.
211. This was suggested in Karsjens v. Jesson, where the judge said that [citing a report of the treatment facility by the Office of the Legislative Auditor for the State] “The OLA
Report found that requiring an independent review body would shelter the MSOP from making unpopular decisions and would ensure that decisions on reduction in custody petitions are
based on risk.” 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1160 (D. Minn. 2015).
212. This may help put an end to the not uncommon practice of the State having a
“revolving door” of experts testifying. I have personally witnessed this on two separate occasions during the time I spent as a 711 licensed law student at the DeKalb Public Defender’s
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In addition, there are clear indications that the recidivism risk for offenders to commit further sex-based crimes is generally very low, depending
on factors such as age at release and whether they received treatment.213
If they no longer present a danger to society or they have been successfully treated for a mental disorder, they can no longer be involuntarily committed under the Due Process Clause, and they should be released.214

IX.

CONCLUSION

Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who
could have acted, the indifference of those who should have
known better, the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most, that has made it possible for evil to triumph.215
-

Haile Selassie

Even the gods fall; Zeus, Tantalus, Tartarus, and the Erinyes have all
faded into distant memory, studied by scholars only interested in a bygone
age. It is time the State of Illinois reevaluate their SVP program and institute
changes so as to not violate the Due Process rights of residents at the TDF,
before the State, too, falls and is forced to change by the judicial system.
Office. The State hires an expert to evaluate and declare an inmate as a SVP, but the expert
determines the inmate does not qualify to be committed. The State, then fires that expert and
hires a new one who determines the inmate does qualify for commitment under the Act. While
the State is within their rights to do this, this “expert shopping” seems, on its face, to present
some issues that may very well cross the border into the realm of punitive action. When you
only use the science that you like, it looks a lot more like vengeance than seeking meaningful
treatment.
213. See supra notes 32, 181.
214. This may also help to alleviate what could be termed as “Willie Horton Syndrome.” William “Willie” Horton was allowed a weekend furlough through a program while
then-governor of Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis, was in office. See Beth Schwartzapfel &
Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited. At the time, he was
serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole after being convicted of participating
in the stabbing death of a robbery victim. Id. He never returned from his furlough, was recaptured after ten months on the run, and was convicted of raping a woman twice and savagely
beating and stabbing her financé while he was out. Id. Although he did not institute the furlough program, this event essentially killed former Governor Dukakis’s run for President. Id.
A judge would understandably be very reluctant to release a convicted sex offender that has
also been committed for a mental disorder in fear of the possible political ramifications if they
re-offend. Id. I am in no way suggesting that this is prevalent amongst judges or is a major
contributing factor in their decision making. However, it is a possible factor, which, if relied
upon too heavily, could result in a resident being committed past the time they should be
released, thus violating their Due Process rights.
215. HAILE SELASSIE, SIMPSON’S CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS (Houghton Mifflin
Company 1988).
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I offer this Note as an opportunity for the state to rectify some of these
issues before a suit is filed and a federal judge strikes down the Act altogether, costing Illinois huge amounts of money and time in defending it, and
then even more vast sums being forced to fix it. The similarities between
Minnesota, Missouri, and Illinois are too close in substance, and the differences between New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin are too vast in comparison that Illinois’s SVP Act will likely not survive a Due Process attack. If the
goal is treatment and reintegration, Illinois’s Act will fall. If the goal is continued punishment, Illinois’s Act will also fall. The State needs to remedy the
situation to avoid any legal issues and subjecting the citizens of Illinois to
spend money that isn’t there on litigation, reevaluation of the residents, and
being forced to come up with an alternative plan all to try and continue to
commit people who no longer deserve to spend time in Tartarus.
A nation’s success or failure in achieving democracy is
judged in part by how well it responds to those at the bottom,
and the margins, of the social order.216
-

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor

216. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, The Third Annual William French Smith Memorial
Lecture: A Conversation with Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 63, 65
(2009).

